There is also
another thing in a man's power, and that is, though he turns his
eyes sometimes towards an object, yet he may choose whether he will
curiously survey it, and with an intent application endeavour to
observe accurately all that is visible in it. But yet, what he does
see, he cannot see otherwise than he does. It depends not on his
will to see that black which appears yellow; nor to persuade himself
that what actually scalds him, feels cold. The earth will not appear
painted with flowers, nor the fields covered with verdure, whenever he
has a mind to it: in the cold winter, he cannot help seeing it white
and hoary, if he will look abroad. Just thus is it with our
understanding: all that is voluntary in our knowledge is the employing
or withholding any of our faculties from this or that sort of objects,
and a more or less accurate survey of them: but, they being
employed, our will hath no power to determine the knowledge of the
mind one way or another; that is done only by the objects
themselves, as far as they are clearly discovered. And therefore, as
far as men's senses are conversant about external objects, the mind
cannot but receive those ideas which are presented by them, and be
informed of the existence of things without: and so far as men's
thoughts converse with their own determined ideas, they cannot but
in some measure observe the agreement or disagreement that is to be
found amongst some of them, which is so far knowledge: and if they
have names for those ideas which they have thus considered, they
must needs be assured of the truth of those propositions which express
that agreement or disagreement they perceive in them, and be
undoubtedly convinced of those truths.
Pages:
959
960
961
962
963
964
965
966
967
968
969
970
971
972
973
974
975
976
977
978
979
980
981
982
983