But to return to the grounds of assent, and the several degrees of it,
we are to take notice, that the propositions we receive upon
inducements of probability are of two sorts: either concerning some
particular existence, or, as it is usually termed, matter of fact,
which, falling under observation, is capable of human testimony; or
else concerning things, which, being beyond the discovery of our
senses, are not capable of any such testimony.
6. The concurrent experience of all other men with ours, produces
assurance approaching to knowledge. Concerning the first of these,
viz. Particular matter of fact.
I. Where any particular thing, consonant to the constant observation
of ourselves and others in the like case, comes attested by the
concurrent reports of all that mention it, we receive it as easily,
and build as firmly upon it, as if it were certain knowledge; and we
reason and act thereupon with as little doubt as if it were perfect
demonstration. Thus, if all Englishmen, who have occasion to mention
it, should affirm that it froze in England the last winter, or that
there were swallows seen there in the summer, I think a man could
almost as little doubt of it as that seven and four are eleven. The
first, therefore, and highest degree of probability, is, when the
general consent of all men, in all ages, as far as it can be known,
concurs with a man's constant and never-failing experience in like
cases, to confirm the truth of any particular matter of fact
attested by fair witnesses: such are all the stated constitutions
and properties of bodies, and the regular proceedings of causes and
effects in the ordinary course of nature.
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