I
may perceive the truth of a proposition, and yet not perceive that
it is an immediate revelation from God. I may perceive the truth of
a proposition in Euclid, without its being, or my perceiving it to be,
a revelation: nay, I may perceive I came not by this knowledge in a
natural way, and so may conclude it revealed, without perceiving
that it is a revelation of God. Because there be spirits which,
without being divinely commissioned, may excite those ideas in me, and
lay them in such order before my mind, that I may perceive their
connexion. So that the knowledge of any proposition coming into my
mind, I know not how, is not a perception that it is from God. Much
less is a strong persuasion that it is true, a perception that it is
from God, or so much as true. But however it be called light and
seeing, I suppose it is at most but belief and assurance: and the
proposition taken for a revelation is not such as they know to be
true, but take to be true. For where a proposition is known to be
true, revelation is needless: and it is hard to conceive how there can
be a revelation to any one of what he knows already. If therefore it
be a proposition which they are persuaded, but do not know, to be
true, whatever they may call it, it is not seeing, but believing.
For these are two ways whereby truth comes into the mind, wholly
distinct, so that one is not the other.
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