They who are blind will always be led by
those that see, or else fall into the ditch: and he is certainly the
most subjected, the most enslaved, who is so in his understanding.
In the foregoing instances some of the causes have been shown of
wrong assent, and how it comes to pass that probable doctrines are not
always received with an assent proportionable to the reasons which are
to be had for their probability: but hitherto we have considered
only such probabilities whose proofs do exist, but do not appear to
him who embraces the error.
7. Fourth cause of error, wrong measures of Probability. Fourthly,
There remains yet the last sort, who, even where the real
probabilities appear, and are plainly laid before them, do not admit
of the conviction, nor yield unto manifest reasons, but do either
epechein, suspend their assent, or give it to the less probable
opinion. And to this danger are those exposed who have taken up
wrong measures of probability, which are:
I. Propositions that are not in themselves certain and evident,
but doubtful and false, taken up for principles.
II. Received hypotheses.
III. Predominant passions or inclinations.
IV. Authority.
8. I. Doubtful propositions taken for principles. The first and
firmest ground of probability is the conformity anything has to our
own knowledge; especially that part of our knowledge which we have
embraced, and continue to look on as principles.
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