Supposed fallacy latent
in the words employed. First, That the arguments being (as for the
most part they are) brought in words, there may be a fallacy latent in
them: and the consequences being, perhaps, many in train, they may
be some of them incoherent. There are very few discourses so short,
clear, and consistent, to which most men may not, with satisfaction
enough to themselves, raise this doubt; and from whose conviction they
may not, without reproach of disingenuity or unreasonableness, set
themselves free with the old reply, Non persuadebis, etiamsi
persuaseris; though I cannot answer, I will not yield.
14. Supposed unknown arguments for the contrary. Secondly,
Manifest probabilities may be evaded, and the assent withheld, upon
this suggestion, That I know not yet all that may he said on the
contrary side. And therefore, though I be beaten, it is not
necessary I should yield, not knowing what forces there are in reserve
behind. This is a refuge against conviction so open and so wide,
that it is hard to determine when a man is quite out of the verge of
it.
15. What probabilities naturally determine the assent. But yet
there is some end of it; and a man having carefully inquired into
all the grounds of probability and unlikeliness; done his utmost to
inform himself in all particulars fairly, and cast up the sum total on
both sides; may, in most cases, come to acknowledge, upon the whole
matter, on which side the probability rests: wherein some proofs in
matter of reason, being suppositions upon universal experience, are so
cogent and clear, and some testimonies in matter of fact so universal,
that he cannot refuse his assent.
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