So that I think we may conclude,
that, in propositions, where though the proofs in view are of most
moment, yet there are sufficient grounds to suspect that there is
either fallacy in words, or certain proofs as considerable to be
produced on the contrary side; there assent, suspense, or dissent, are
often voluntary actions. But where the proofs are such as make it
highly probable, and there is not sufficient ground to suspect that
there is either fallacy of words (which sober and serious
consideration may discover) nor equally valid proofs yet undiscovered,
latent on the other side (which also the nature of the thing may, in
some cases, make plain to a considerate man); there, I think, a man
who has weighed them can scarce refuse his assent to the side on which
the greater probability appears. Whether it be probable that a
promiscuous jumble of printing letters should often fall into a method
and order, which should stamp on paper a coherent discourse; or that a
blind fortuitous concourse of atoms, not guided by an understanding
agent, should frequently constitute the bodies of any species of
animals: in these and the like cases, I think, nobody that considers
them can be one jot at a stand which side to take, nor at all waver in
his assent. Lastly, when there can be no supposition (the thing in its
own nature indifferent, and wholly depending upon the testimony of
witnesses) that there is as fair testimony against, as for the
matter of fact attested; which by inquiry is to be learned, v.
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