g.
whether there was one thousand seven hundred years ago such a man at
Rome as Julius Caesar: in all such cases, I say, I think it is not
in any rational man's power to refuse his assent; but that it
necessarily follows, and closes with such probabilities. In other less
clear cases, I think it is in man's power to suspend his assent; and
perhaps content himself with the proofs he has, if they favour the
opinion that suits with his inclination or interest, and so stop
from further search. But that a man should afford his assent to that
side on which the less probability appears to him, seems to me utterly
impracticable, and as impossible as it is to believe the same thing
probable and improbable at the same time.
16. Where it is in our power to suspend our judgment. As knowledge
is no more arbitrary than perception; so, I think, assent is no more
in our power than knowledge. When the agreement of any two ideas
appears to our minds, whether immediately or by the assistance of
reason, I can no more refuse to perceive, no more avoid knowing it,
than I can avoid seeing those objects which I turn my eyes to, and
look on in daylight; and what upon full examination I find the most
probable, I cannot deny my assent to. But, though we cannot hinder our
knowledge, where the agreement is once perceived; nor our assent,
where the probability manifestly appears upon due consideration of all
the measures of it: yet we can hinder both knowledge and assent, by
stopping our inquiry, and not employing our faculties in the search of
any truth.
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