The greater probability, I think, in
that case will determine the assent: and a man can no more avoid
assenting, or taking it to be true, where he perceives the greater
probability, than he can avoid knowing it to be true, where he
perceives the agreement or disagreement of any two ideas.
If this be so, the foundation of error will lie in wrong measures of
probability; as the foundation of vice in wrong measures of good.
17. IV. Authority. The fourth and last wrong measure of
probability I shall take notice of, and which keeps in ignorance or
error more people than all the other together, is that which I have
mentioned in the foregoing chapter: I mean the giving up our assent to
the common received opinions, either of our friends or party,
neighbourhood or country. How many men have no other ground for
their tenets, than the supposed honesty, or learning, or number of
those of the same profession? As if honest or bookish men could not
err; or truth were to be established by the vote of the multitude: yet
this with most men serves the turn. The tenet has had the
attestation of reverend antiquity; it comes to me with the passport of
former ages, and therefore I am secure in the reception I give it:
other men have been and are of the same opinion, (for that is all is
said,) and therefore it is reasonable for me to embrace it.
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